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Games Played Through Agents

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007
Econometrica. 2003.  Vol. 71. No. 4. P. 989-1026. 
Тематические разделы:
We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple common agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals. Each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action taken by the agent. We characterize pure-strategy equilibria and we provide conditions-in terms of game balancedness-for the existence of an equilibrium with an efficient outcome. Games played through agents display a type of strategic inefficiency that is absent when either there is a unique principal or there is a unique agent.

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текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте Университета Миннесота:
http://www.econ.umn.edu/~arust/mn02-07-29.pdf
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