Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts

Cheap Talk

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1996.  Vol. 10. No. 3. P. 103-118. 
Тематический раздел:
Economists often ask how private information is shared through markets, costly signaling, and other mechanisms. Yet most information sharing is done through ordinary, informal talk. Economists are inconsistent in their view of such 'cheap talk': sometimes it is supposed that communication generally leads to efficient equilibria; other times it is supposed that since 'talk is cheap,' it is never credible. The authors think both views are wrong. In this paper, they describe what some recent research in game theory teaches about when people will convey private information by cheap talk.

Ссылки
текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте JSTOR:
http://www.jstor.org/view/08953309/di980588/98p0325e/0
BiBTeX
RIS
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Paul Anthony Samuelson
[Книга]
Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole
[Книга]
Ольга Николаевна Арзякова, Гавриил Александрович Агарков, Валентин Михайлович Кормышев
Университетское управление. 1998.  № 4(7). С. 49-51. 
[Статья]
Владимир Исаакович Верховин
Мир России. 1999.  Т. 8. № 3. С. 173-185. 
[Статья]
Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Econometrica. 1987.  Vol. 55. No. 3. P. 615-632. 
[Статья]
Экономическая наука современной России. 2002.  № 2. С. 173-176. 
[Статья]