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Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1987.  Vol. 102. No. 2. P. 179-221. 
Тематический раздел:
Games in which one party conveys private information to a second through messages typically admit large numbers of sequential equilibria, as the second party may entertain a wealth of beliefs in response to out-of-equilibrium messages. By restricting those out-of equilibrium beliefs, one can sometimes eliminate many unintuitive equilibria. We present a number of formal restrictions of this sort, investigate their behavior in specific examples, and relate these restrictions to Kohlberg and Mertens` notion of stability.

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текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте JSTOR:
http://www.jstor.org/view/00335533/di951874/95p0180k/0
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