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Reputation and Imperfect Information

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007
Journal of Economic Theory. 1982.  Vol. 27. No. 2. P. 253-279. 
Тематический раздел:
A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that is multistage games, players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten's finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. We reexamine Selten's model, adding to it a small amount of imperfect (or incomplete) information about players' payoffs, and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects.

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http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYGCVT-10R/2/4c0593999b079d5b6b2685178d4d7a00
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