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Sequential Equilibria

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007
Econometrica. 1982.  Vol. 50. No. 4. P. 863-94. 
Тематический раздел:
We propose a new criterion for equilibria of extensive games, in the spirit of Selten's perfectness criteria. This criterion requires that players' strategies be sequentially rational: Every decision must be part of an optimal strategy for the remainder of the game. This entails specification of players' beliefs concerning how the game has evolved for each information set, including information sets off the equilibrium path. The properties of sequential equilibria are developed; in particular, we study the topological structure of the set of sequential equilibria. The connections with Selten's trembling-hand perfect equilibria are given.

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