Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts

A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007
Econometrica. 1994.  Vol. 62. No. 4. P. 795-817. 
Тематический раздел:
A noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility. The implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible. In the model proposed, time is continuous. This idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core - there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated.

Ссылки
текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте JSTOR:
http://www.jstor.org/view/00129682/di982577/98p0264x/0
BiBTeX
RIS
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Paul Anthony Samuelson
[Книга]
Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole
[Книга]
Levent Kockesen
[Учебная программа]
Lawrence M. Ausubel
[Учебная программа]
Robert H. Porter
[Учебная программа]
Юлия Владимировна Филатова
TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2007.  Т. 5. № 4. С. 130-134. 
[Статья]