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A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007
Games and Economic Behavior. 1999.  Vol. 26. No. 2. P. 286-336. 
Тематический раздел:
Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilibrium coalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain conditions) an equilibrium coalition structure. Our characterization results are especially sharp for symmetric partition functions. In particular, we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a Cournot oligopoly.

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текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте JSTOR:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45JC97N-V/2/bab9dabc9baa0ed60697e696710279b7
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