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The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007
Econometrica. 1994.  Vol. 62. No. 4. P. 939-948. 
Тематический раздел:
The paper discusses perfect "folk theorems" for infinitely repeated games with complete information. Folk theorems assert that any feasible and individually rational payoff vector of the stage game is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff in the associated infinitely repeated game with little or no discounting. It is obvious that feasibility and individual rationality are necessary conditions for a payoff vector to be an equilibrium payoff. The content of the folk theorems is that these conditions are also sufficient. Perhaps the first folk theorem type result is due to Friedman (1971) who showed that any feasible payoff which Pareto dominates a Nash equilibrium payoff of the stage game will be an equilibrium payoff in the associated repeated game with sufficiently patient players.

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