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The Evolution of Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Emerging Markets: The Case of Sellier and Bellot

Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
ECGI - Finance Working Paper. 2005.  No. 59/2004.
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This paper investigates the evolution of corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets. It focuses on Czech ammunition manufacturer Sellier and Bellot (S&B) following voucher privatization in 1993. Exogenously imposed diffuse ownership, combined with legal, capital market, and accounting defi ciencies, contributed to poor corporate governance and weak fi rm performance. It also impeded corporate governance change toward optimal concentrated ownership structure. Five years of dismal accounting and stock return performance, default, and a failed attempt to sell the company passed before a single blockholder acquired control, installed new management, and dramatically improved profi tability. This study is one of the fi rst todescribe the path of evolution from a suboptimal to an optimal governance structure. Turnaround was accomplished through the adoption of monitoring and incentive mechanisms known to mitigate owner-manager agency confl icts in developed countries. The S&B experience has policy implications for emerging countries undergoing mass privatization.

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