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Optimal Collusion with Private Information

Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
RAND Journal of Economics. 2001.  Vol. 32. No. 3. P. 428-465. 
We analyze collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, where prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. Productive efficiency is possible only if high-cost firms relinquish market share. In the most profitable collusive schemes, firms implement productive efficiency, and high-cost firms are favored with higher expected market share in future periods. If types are discrete, there exists a discount factor strictly less than one above which first-best profits can be attained using history-dependent reallocation of market share between equally efficient firms. We also analyze the role of communication and side-payments.

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http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261(200123)32%3A3%3C428%3AOCWPI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N
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