Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
Review of Economic Studies.
1997.
Vol. 64.
No. 3.
P. 445-464.
This paper shows that in a frictional labor market part of the productivity gains
from general training will be captured by future employers. As a result, investments
in general skills will be suboptimally low, and contrary to the standard theory,
part of the costs may be borne by the employers. The paper also demonstrates that
the interaction between innovation and training leads to an amplification of this
inefficiency and to a multiplicity of equilibria. Workers are more willing to invest
in their skills by accepting lower wages today if they expect more firms to innovate
and pay them higher wages in the future. Similarly, firms are more willing to innovate
when they expect the quality of the future workforce to be higher, thus when workers
invest more in their skills.
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