Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under Different Institutional Arrangements

The paper analyses the problem of coordinating fiscal and monetary policies within an explicit game theoretic model of the interaction between different policy institutions. Specifically, the question is considered under (i) different institutional arrangements, (ii) different kinds of reaction of the two authorities, and (iii) different macroeconomic frameworks. The implications for inflation and output as well as the gains from cooperative policy decisions are considered.

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