Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under Different Institutional Arrangements
Опубликовано на портале: 18-09-2007
European Journal of Political Economy.
1986.
Vol. 2.
No. 2.
P. 169-191.
Тематический раздел:
The paper analyses the problem of coordinating fiscal and monetary policies within
an explicit game theoretic model of the interaction between different policy institutions.
Specifically, the question is considered under (i) different institutional arrangements,
(ii) different kinds of reaction of the two authorities, and (iii) different macroeconomic
frameworks. The implications for inflation and output as well as the gains from cooperative
policy decisions are considered.
Полный текст статьи находится на сайте ScienceDirect в закрытом доступе.
По ссылке размещена аннотация
Ключевые слова
game-theoretic model взаимодействие фискальной и монетарной политики теоретико-игровое моделирование
См. также:
European Journal of Political Economy.
2004.
Vol. 20.
No. 3.
P. 709-724.
[Статья]
Journal of Macroeconomics.
2007.
Vol. 29.
No. 4.
P. 665-689 .
[Статья]
Economics Letters.
2004.
Vol. 85.
No. 1.
P. 103-110.
[Статья]
Journal of Macroeconomics.
2007.
Vol. 29.
No. 4.
P. 959-975.
[Статья]
CEPR Discussion Papers.
2002.
No. 3336.
[Статья]
Journal of International Economics.
2003.
Vol. 60.
No. 2.
P. 235-247.
[Статья]
Working Paper (University of Rome "La Sapienza").
2004.
No. 74.
[Статья]