A Game between the Fiscal and the Monetary Authorities under Inflation Targeting
Опубликовано на портале: 24-09-2007
European Journal of Political Economy.
2004.
Vol. 20.
No. 3.
P. 709-724.
Тематический раздел:
Interest-rate and exchange-rate dynamics is studied in a game between the monetary
and fiscal policymakers where the monetary policymaker targets inflation. In the
Nash game, a conflict over the appropriate size of the output gap leads to excessive
interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility. For this reason, there are benefits in
restricting fiscal policymaking. If the fiscal policymaker, however, is considered
to have a first-mover advantage, the fiscal policymaker will internalise its effect
on monetary policy, and the conflict is resolved and interest-rate and exchange-rate
volatility is reduced.
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Ключевые слова
inflation targeting interaction of monetary and fiscal policy взаимодействие фискальной и монетарной политики теоретико-игровое моделирование
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