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A Game between the Fiscal and the Monetary Authorities under Inflation Targeting

Опубликовано на портале: 24-09-2007
European Journal of Political Economy. 2004.  Vol. 20. No. 3. P. 709-724. 
Interest-rate and exchange-rate dynamics is studied in a game between the monetary and fiscal policymakers where the monetary policymaker targets inflation. In the Nash game, a conflict over the appropriate size of the output gap leads to excessive interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility. For this reason, there are benefits in restricting fiscal policymaking. If the fiscal policymaker, however, is considered to have a first-mover advantage, the fiscal policymaker will internalise its effect on monetary policy, and the conflict is resolved and interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility is reduced.

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