Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2004
Journal of Political Economy.
1980.
Vol. 88.
No. 2.
P. 288-307.
Тематические разделы:
This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security ownership and control,
typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization.
We first set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful
sense. The entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large
modern corporation. The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur--management
and risk bearing--are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts
called a firm. The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces
the evolution of devides for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire
team and of its individual members. Individual participants in the firm, and in particular
its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets
for their services, both within and outside the firm.
Материалы статьи используются в книге "Принципы корпоративных финансов" (Брейли, Майерс)
Ключевые слова
agency problem risk management theory of firm акционер проблемы управления риск теория фирмы управление рисками
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