на главную поиск contacts

Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2004
Journal of Political Economy. 1980.  Vol. 88. No. 2. P. 288-307. 
This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization. We first set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. The entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation. The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur--management and risk bearing--are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devides for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm.

Материалы статьи используются в книге "Принципы корпоративных финансов" (Брейли, Майерс)

текст статьи на сайте JSTOR:
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Frank Heineman Knight
THESIS: теория и история экономических и социальных институтов и систем. 1994.  № 5. С. 12-28. 
Василий Николаевич Якимкин
Vernon L. Smith, James M. Walker
Economic Inquiry. 1993.  Vol. 31. No. 2. P. 237-246. 
Максим Владимирович Белоусенко
TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2005.  Т. 3. № 2. С. 58-72. 
Вадим Борисович Ольшанский, Наталья Юрьевна Волжская
Директор школы. 2000.  № 9. С. 19-28. 
Н.А. Исаева
Экономические науки. 2009.  № 5. С. 145-148. 
Zana Kruja