Games of Monetary and Fiscal Interactions in the EMU
Опубликовано на портале: 21-10-2007
European Economic Review.
2001.
Vol. 45.
No. 4-6.
P. 589-613.
Тематический раздел:
This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have
different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and
stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy
rule that averages the member countries' most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship
where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert
the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall
that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary
commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.
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