Games of Monetary and Fiscal Interactions in the EMU

This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy rule that averages the member countries' most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.

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