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Strategic Debt Accumulation in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union

Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007
European Journal of Political Economy. 2003.  Vol. 19. No. 1. P. 1-15. 
This paper explores the interaction between centralized monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policy in a monetary union with heterogeneous countries. Discretionary monetary policy suffers from a failure to commit. Moreover, heterogeneous decentralized fiscal policymakers impose externalities on each other through the influence of their debt policies on the common monetary policy. These imperfections can be alleviated by adopting shock-contingent inflation targets (to combat the monetary policy commitment problem) and shock-contingent debt targets (to internalize the externalities due to decentralized fiscal policy).

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