Strategic Debt Accumulation in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union
Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007
European Journal of Political Economy.
2003.
Vol. 19.
No. 1.
P. 1-15.
Тематический раздел:
This paper explores the interaction between centralized monetary policy and decentralized
fiscal policy in a monetary union with heterogeneous countries. Discretionary monetary
policy suffers from a failure to commit. Moreover, heterogeneous decentralized fiscal
policymakers impose externalities on each other through the influence of their debt
policies on the common monetary policy. These imperfections can be alleviated by
adopting shock-contingent inflation targets (to combat the monetary policy commitment
problem) and shock-contingent debt targets (to internalize the externalities due
to decentralized fiscal policy).
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Ключевые слова
debt targets EMU inflation targeting monetary and fiscal policy monetary union взаимодействие фискальной и монетарной политики
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