Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts

Interaction of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies

Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007
American Economic Review. 2003.  Vol. 93. No. 5. P. 1522-1542. 
We consider monetary-fiscal interaction when the monetary authority is more conservative than the fiscal. With both policies discretionary, (1) Nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher price than the ideal points of both authorities, (2) of the two leadership possibilities, fiscal leadership is generally better. With fiscal discretion, monetary commitment yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks. But fiscal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion. Second-best outcomes require either joint commitment, or identical targets for the two authorities – output socially optimal and price level appropriately conservative – or complete separation of tasks.

Аннотация и первая страница статьи представлены на сайте JSTOR. Полный текст статьи находится в закрытом доступе

Препринт (полный текст) статьи представлен на сайте Boston College
BiBTeX
RIS
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Andrew Hughes Hallett, Diana Weymark
CEPR Discussion Papers. 2002.  No. 3336.
[Статья]
Avinash K. Dixit
European Economic Review. 2001.  Vol. 45. No. 4-6. P. 589-613. 
[Статья]
Roel M.W.J. Beetsma, Lans Arij Bovenberg
European Journal of Political Economy. 2003.  Vol. 19. No. 1. P. 1-15. 
[Статья]
Avinash K. Dixit, Luisa Lambertini
Journal of International Economics. 2003.  Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 235-247. 
[Статья]
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Debora Di Gioacchino
Working Paper (University of Rome "La Sapienza"). 2004.  No. 74.
[Статья]
Cindy Moons, Harry Garretsen, Bas van Aarle, Jorge Fornero
Journal of Policy Modeling. 2007.  Vol. 29. No. 6. P. 879-902. 
[Статья]