Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?
Опубликовано на портале: 26-10-2007
CEPR Discussion Papers.
2006.
No. 5470.
Тематические разделы:
The paper incorporates three institutional design features into a Kydland-Prescott,
Barro-Gordon monetary policy game. It shows that goal independence and goal transparency
(an explicit inflation target) at the central bank are substitute ‘commitment
technologies’ that reduce inflation and build credibility. In addition, goal-transparency
is shown to be socially superior as it also lowers public’s monitoring cost.
Nevertheless, independent central bankers are less likely to embrace it if they perceive
public scrutiny (accountability) as intrusive. Combining these findings implies that
both goal-transparency and accountability will be negatively related to goal-independence
for which we present empirical support using established indices. Our analysis further
suggests that, to avoid an inferior equilibrium with opaque objectives and a ‘democratic
deficit’, institutional reforms should follow the Bank of England scenario,
in which an explicit inflation target is first legislated and only then instrument
(but not goal) independence granted.
Аннотация препринта представлена на сайте CEPR. Полный текст препринта находится в закрытом доступе
Полный текст препринта, например, доступен зарегистрированным пользователям библиотеки EERC (по ссылке открывается список публикаций, среди которых находится указанный препринт)
Ключевые слова
См. также:
Journal of Monetary Economics.
2006.
Vol. 53.
No. 3.
P. 473-506.
[Статья]
European Journal of Political Economy.
2004.
Vol. 20.
No. 3.
P. 709-724.
[Статья]
[Книга]
Journal of International Economics.
2000.
Vol. 50.
No. 1.
P. 155–183 .
[Статья]
NBER Working Paper Series.
2001.
No. 8397.
[Статья]
IMF ,Working Paper.
2007.
No. 07/190.
[Статья]