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Discretionary Monetary Policy and Inflation Persistence

Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007
Journal of Monetary Economics. 2005.  Vol. 52. No. 2. P. 477-496. 
Rational expectations models of staggered price/wage contracts have failed to replicate the observed persistence in inflation and unemployment during disinflationary periods. The current literature on this persistency puzzle has focused on augmenting the nominal contract model with imperfect credibility and learning. In this paper, I re-examine the persistency puzzle by focusing on the discretionary nature of monetary policy. I show that when the central bank is allowed to re-optimize a quadratic loss function each period, imperfect credibility and learning, even in the absence of staggered contracts, can generate a significant amount of inflation persistence and employment losses during a disinflationary period.

Аннотация статьи представлена на сайте ScienceDirect. Полный текст статьи находится в закрытом доступе

Препринт (полный текст) статьи размешен на сайте The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies