Rational expectations models of staggered price/wage contracts have failed to replicate
the observed persistence in inflation and unemployment during disinflationary periods.
The current literature on this persistency puzzle has focused on augmenting the nominal
contract model with imperfect credibility and learning. In this paper, I re-examine
the persistency puzzle by focusing on the discretionary nature of monetary policy.
I show that when the central bank is allowed to re-optimize a quadratic loss function
each period, imperfect credibility and learning, even in the absence of staggered
contracts, can generate a significant amount of inflation persistence and employment
losses during a disinflationary period.
статьи представлена на сайте ScienceDirect. Полный текст статьи находится в закрытом
текст) статьи размешен на сайте The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International