From Shareholder Value to CEO Power: the Paradox of the 1990s
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Competition and Change.
2005.
Vol. 9.
No. 1.
P. 7–47.
Тематические разделы:
Why did CEO remuneration explode during the 1990s and persist at high levels, even after the
Internet bubble burst? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given
of this paradox, mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science,
business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy and network analysis. It is
argued that the diffusion of stock options and financial market-related incentives, supposed
to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration
and wealth, both at micro and macro level. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of
executives with financiers, who have exploited the long-run erosion of wage earners’ bargaining
power. The article also discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability
and the adverse consequences of CEO and top-manager opportunism: reputation, business
ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or a shift from a shareholder to a
stakeholder conception.
Ключевые слова
CEO corporate governance corporate governance systems shareholder value sociology of economic development
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