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Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value

Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Journal of Banking & Finance. 2005.  Vol. 29. No. 7. P. 1813-1834. 
This paper investigates the effects of having multiple large shareholders on the valuation of firms. Using data on Finnish listed firms, we show, consistent with our model, that a more equal distribution of votes among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. This result is particularly strong in family-controlled firms suggesting that families (which typically have managerial or board representation) are more prone to private benefit extraction if they are not monitored by another strong blockholder. We also show that the relation between multiple blockholders and firm value is significantly affected by the identity of these blockholders.

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