Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Journal of Financial Intermediation.
2006.
Vol. 15.
No. 1.
P. 1-31.
Тематические разделы:
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial
incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the
expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because
monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship
between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates
monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration
and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and
monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the
relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone.
This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private
benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate
the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
Ключевые слова
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