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Corporate Governance and Manager Turnover: An Unusual Social Experiment

Опубликовано на портале: 12-02-2007
Journal of Banking & Finance. 2005.  No. 29. P. 1459-1481. 
This paper examines empirically the quality of the governance mechanisms of Chinese state-owned enterprises from 1994–1999, a period marked by substantial changes in policies affecting the governance structure of these firms. It shows that the restructuring of these enterprises according to corporate law improved the effectiveness of their governance system. Specifically, restructuring strengthened the links between manager turnover and firm performance. The results indicate that firm performance was significantly and negatively related to manager demotion for incorporated state-owned enterprises, while this relationship was insignificant for unincorporated enterprises. They also indicate that manager turnover was a viable incentive mechanism for improving future enterprise performance.

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текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте Science Direct:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VCY-4D3B2T7-1/2/10437b9d7832f186399bcd8dfb691998
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