Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2007
Journal of Financial Economics.
1999.
No. 51.
P. 371-406.
Тематические разделы:
We find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount
of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for standard
economic determinants of pay. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients on the board
and ownership structure variables suggest that CEOs earn greater compensation when
governance structures are less effective. We also find that the predicted component
of compensation arising from these characteristics of board and ownership structure
has a statistically signifficant negative relation with subsequent firm operating
and stock return performance. Overall, our results suggest that firms with weaker
governance structures have greater agency problems; that CEOs at firms with greater
agency problems receive greater compensation; and that firms with greater agency
problems perform worse.
Ключевые слова
См. также:
Academy Of Management Review.
2003.
Vol. 28.
No. 3.
P. 447-465.
[Статья]
West European Politics.
2003.
Vol. 26.
No. 4.
P. 179-198.
[Статья]
American Business Review.
2004.
Vol. 22.
No. 2.
P. 82-87.
[Статья]
Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
2003.
No. 19.
P. 335-347.
[Статья]
Industrial and Corporate Change.
2008.
Vol. 17.
No. 1.
P. 1-27.
[Статья]
Rotterdam School of Economics Research Papers.
2002.
ERS-2002-06-F&A.
[Статья]