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Information and the Market for Lemons

Опубликовано на портале: 17-09-2008
RAND Journal of Economics. 2001.  Vol. 32. No. 4. P. 657-666. 
Тематический раздел:
This paper revisits Akerlofs (1970) classic adverse selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Better information on the selling side worsens the buyers curse, thus lowering demand, but may shift supply as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on the relative sizes of these effects. A characteization is given. On the other hand, improving the buyers information i.e. making private information public unambiguously improves trade so long as market demand is downward sloping.

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См. также:
George A. Akerlof
THESIS: теория и история экономических и социальных институтов и систем. 1994.  № 5. С. 91-104. 
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Review of Economic Studies. 2002.  Vol. 69. No. 2. P. 437-466. 
Richard Portes, Helene Rey
EFA Working Papers. 2000.  No. 0014.
Theodore Groves
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Xenia Matschke
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Sreedhar T. Bharath, Paolo Pasquariello, Guojun Wu
Working Paper Series (SSRN). 2006.