Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Journal of Finance.
2002.
Vol. 57.
No. 3.
P. 1147-1170.
Тематические разделы:
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and
of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We
then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies.
Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries
with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow
ownership by the controlling shareholder.
Ссылки
http://ws1.ad.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/Valuation_JOFJune2002.pdfhttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=192549
http://transfinco.com/Documents/Investor%20Protection%20and%20Corporate%20Valuation.pdf
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications/LaPorta%20PDF%20Papers-ALL/Valuation_JOF_MAY2001.pdf
Ключевые слова
comparative economics corporate governance corporate governance systems investor protection law and economics law and finance
См. также:
Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
2003.
No. 19.
P. 335-347.
[Статья]
Industrial and Corporate Change.
2008.
Vol. 17.
No. 1.
P. 1-27.
[Статья]
Journal of Comparative Economics.
2003.
Vol. 31.
No. 4.
P. 595-619.
[Статья]