на главную поиск contacts


Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development.

Ключевые слова

См. также:
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Journal of Finance. 1997.  Vol. 52. No. 2. P. 737-783. 
Anders Aslund
Экономический журнал ВШЭ. 2001.  Т. 5. № 3. С. 311-327. 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Andrew T. Guzman
NBER Working Paper Series. 1998.  w6521.
William N. Landes, Richard A. Posner
NBER Working Paper Series. 1997.  No. 217.
Simeon Djankov, Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
Journal of Comparative Economics. 2003.  Vol. 31. No. 4. P. 595-619. 
Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci
Economic Analysis of Law A European Perspective, Hatzis Aritides. 2003.