Law and Finance
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Journal of Political Economy.
1998.
Vol. 106.
No. 6.
P. 1113-1155.
Тематические разделы:
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and
creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49
countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest,
and French-civil-law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with
German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle. We also find
that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively
related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified
shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their
rights.
Ссылки
http://www.jourdan.ens.fr/piketty/fichiers/enseig/ecoineg/articl/LaPortaetal1998.pdfhttp://www.jourdan.ens.fr/piketty/fichiers/enseig/ecoineg/articl/LaPortaetal1998.pdf
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications/LaPorta%20PDF%20Papers-ALL/Law%20and%20Finance-All/Law%20and%20Finance.pdf
Ключевые слова
comparative economics comparative economic systems corporate governance corporate governance systems law and economics law and finance
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