Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts

Family firms

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Journal of Finance. 2003.  Vol. 58. No. 5. P. 2167-2201 . 
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.

Ссылки
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/FamilyFirms.pdf
http://www.econ.upf.edu/~penalva/seminar/02_2Spring/panunzi.pdf
BiBTeX
RIS
Ключевые слова

См. также:
[Интернет-ресурс]
Robert Boyer
Research & Regulation Working Papers. 2005.  No. 2005-1.
[Статья]
Sigurt Vitols
Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005.  Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 386 - 396. 
[Статья]
Robert Boyer
PSE Working Papers. 2005.  No. 2005-39.
[Статья]
David Yermack
Journal of Financial Economics. 2003.  Vol. 40. No. 2. P. 185-211. 
[Статья]
Sigurt Vitols
Competition and Change. 2004.  Vol. 8. No. 4. P. 357-374. 
[Статья]