Agency problems and dividend policies around the world
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Journal of Finance.
2000.
Vol. 55.
No. 1.
P. 1-33 .
Тематические разделы:
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome
model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders
to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing
equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment
of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder
rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts
the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with
different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model
of dividends.
Ключевые слова
comparative economics corporate governance corporate governance systems dividend policy law and economics law and finance
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