The evolution of common law
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Journal of Political Economy.
2007.
Vol. 115.
No. 1.
P. 43-68.
Тематический раздел:
We present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views. Policy-motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency, but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law's precision. We call our central finding the Cardozo theorem: even when judges are motivated by personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise. Our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law.
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См. также:
Economic Analysis of Law A European Perspective, Hatzis Aritides.
2003.
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Journal of Comparative Economics.
2003.
Vol. 31.
No. 4.
P. 595-619.
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