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Corporate Governance versus Economic Governance: Banks and Industrial Restructuring in the U.S. and Germany

Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008
WZB Discussion Paper. 1995.  No. 95-310 .
This paper critically examines the debate on corporate governance and the claim (often made in Anglo-American companies) that the close links between German banks and industry are primarily responsible for the longer-term investment strategies and greater quality competitiveness of German manufacturing. Instead, it is argued here that manufacturing investment and bank behavior must be examined within a broader system of economic governance. In particular, the regulation of labor markets is a key factor influencing company choices between price and quality-competitive strategies. The corporatist regulation of German labor markets has encouraged quality-competitive strategies by keeping labor costs out of competition to a greater extent than in the US, where a collapse in pattern bargaining in core manufacturing industries and the strategic use of bankruptcy was motivated by companies' attempts to gain a comparative price advantage on the basis of lower labor costs. This argument is supported through a case study of the restructuring of the steel industry in Germany and the US in the 1980s.

Ссылки
http://skylla.wzb.eu/pdf/1995/i95-310.pdf
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=607641
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