This paper suggests a two-dimensional concept of nonliberal capitalism: coordinated
capitalism (as described in the varieties of capitalism framework) and organized capitalism.
While the coordination function of institutions canalizes individual maximization
strategies of firms in order to adjust for collective action problems, the organization
function transcends maximization strategies and adjusts them to collective
interests beyond maximization. Political economies are highly organized when firms
are not only the private business of owners and insiders but, in addition, quasi-public
infrastructures and, therefore, highly constrained in their economic decisions by institutionally
sanctioned collective interests (such as sectoral interests, class interests, or
political interests). I construct an index on organized capitalism by combining data on
ownership structures, board level codetermination, the density of employers’ associations
and trade union density in order to allow for comparison between varying extents
of coordination and organization in 20 OECD countries. The German example is used
to demonstrate the analytical usefulness of the coordination–organization distinction
in qualitative terms. The distinction allows for differentiation between two forms of
liberalization: declining coordination and disorganization.