Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts

The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform.

Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008
Politics & Society. 2006.  Vol. 34. No. 4. P. 463-502. 
A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties’ established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform.

Ссылки
http://www.mpifg.de/people/mh/paper/CioffiHoepner%202006%20P_and_S%20-%20Party%20Paradox.pdf
http://pas.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/34/4/463
BiBTeX
RIS
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Ronald Philip Dore, Mari Sako
[Книга]
Wolfgang Streeck, Colin Crouch, Robert Boyer, Bruno Amable, Peter A. Hall, Gregory Jackson
Socio-Economic Review. 2005.  Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 359-382. 
[Статья]
[Интернет-ресурс]
Robert Boyer
Research & Regulation Working Papers. 2005.  No. 2005-1.
[Статья]
Sigurt Vitols
Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005.  Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 386 - 396. 
[Статья]