A new financial capitalism? Explaining the persistence of exit over voice in contemporary corporate governance
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
European Management Review.
2008.
Vol. 5.
No. 1.
P. 23-26.
Тематические разделы:
The article 'A New Finance Capitalism?' raises an important paradox. Institutional investors are growing in size and the concentration of their stakes gives them potential influence over managers. Yet we observe an unexpected absence of shareholder activism and voice on the part of institutional investors in contemporary America. Concentration occurs without commitment. This comment further explores some reasons why today's largest investors seem resigned to or even to benefit from their relative passivity and preference of exit over voice. These reasons include conflicts of interest, market failures, lack of organizational capabilities, use of informal voice, and dependence of markets for corporate control. Corporate governance scholars have surprisingly little evidence on these topics, which suggest an important agenda for future research.
Ключевые слова
comparative corporate governance comparative political economy corporate governance corporate governance systems finance in corporate governance institutional investor market for corporate control role of institutional investors shareholder activism varieties of capitalism
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Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
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