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Management Control and Innovative Activity

Опубликовано на портале: 12-12-2002
This paper discusses the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. Economic theory proposes different incentives in owner-led firms and manager-controlled firms. In the first place, the impact of risk on the incentive to invest in R&D are compared for the capital-led and the managerial firm. On the one hand, the risk of dismissal for the manager implies less innovative investment than in the traditional capital-led firm. On the other hand, innovative activity will most likely increase the growth rate and therefore the size of a firm. This is a positive stimulus for R&D in the managerial firm.

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