Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts

Auction Theory

Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
San Diego: Academic Press, 2006, 200 с.
Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.

1. Introduction

Part I. Single Object Auctions

  • 2. Private Value Auctions: A First Look
    • 2.1 The Symmetric Model
    • 2.2 Second-Price Auctions
    • 2.3 First-Price Auctions
    • 2.4 Revenue Comparison
    • 2.5 Reserve Prices
  • 3. The Revenue Equivalence Principle
    • 3.1 Main Result
    • 3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle
  • 4. Qualifications and Extensions
    • 4.1 Risk-Averse Bidders
    • 4.2 Budget Constraints
    • 4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders
    • 4.4 Resale and Efficiency
  • 5. Mechanism Design
    • 5.1 Mechanisms
    • 5.2 Optimal Mechanisms
    • 5.3 Efficient Mechanism
  • 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values
    • 6.1 The Symmetric Model
    • 6.2 Second-Price Auctions
    • 6.3 English Auctions
    • 6.4 First-Price Auctions
    • 6.5 Revenue Comparisons
    • 6.6 Efficiency
  • 7. The Revenue Ranking (“Linkage”) Principle
    • 7.1 The Main Result
    • 7.2 Public Information
    • 7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle
  • 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications
    • 8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle
    • 8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions
    • 8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
    • 8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees
  • 9. Efficiency and the English Auction
    • 9.1 The Single Crossing Condition
    • 9.2 Two-Bidder Auctions
    • 9.3 The Average Crossing Condition
    • 9.4 Three or More Bidders
    • 9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2
    • 9.6 Miscellany
  • 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
    • 10.1 Efficient Mechanisms
    • 10.2 Optimal Mechanisms
  • 11. Bidding Rings
    • 11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions
    • 11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions

Part II. Multiple Object Auctions

  • 12. An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions
    • 12.1 Sealed-Bid Auctions for Selling Multiple Units
    • 12.2 Some Open Auctions
  • 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
    • 13.1 The Basic Model
    • 13.2 Vickrey Auctions
    • 13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions
    • 13.4 Uniform Price Auctions
    • 13.5 Discriminatory Auctions
  • 14. Some Revenue Considerations
    • 14.1 Revenue Equivalence in Multiunit Auctions
    • 14.2 Revenue Equivalence with Multiunit Demand: An Example
  • 15. Sequential Sales
    • 15.1 Sequential First-Price Auctions
    • 15.2 Sequential Second-Price Auctions
  • 16. Nonidentical Objects
    • 16.1 The Model
    • 16.2 Efficient Allocations
    • 16.3 Substitutes and Complements
    • 16.4 Bundling
    • 16.5 Some Computational Issues
    • 16.6 Budget Constraints
  • 17. Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values
    • 17.1 One Dimensional Signals
    • 17.2 Multidimensional Signals

Part III. Appendices

  • A. Continuous Distributions
  • B. Stochastic Orders
  • C. Order Statistics
  • D. Affiliated Random Variables
  • E. Some Linear Algebra
  • F. Games of Incomplete Information
  • G. Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions

References
Index

Ключевые слова

См. также:
Владимир Исаакович Верховин
Мир России. 2001.  Т. 10. № 1. С. 106-124. 
[Статья]
Drew Fudenberg, David Knudsen Levine
[Книга]
Yildiz Muhamet Yildiz
[Учебная программа]
[Учебная программа]
Георгий Борисович Клейнер, Максим Александрович Рыбачук, Дмитрий Викторович Ушаков
TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2018.  Т. 16. № 1. С. 20-36. 
[Статья]
Владимир Васильевич Мельников, Ольга Александровна Лукашенко
TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2019.  Т. 17. № 1. С. 150-173. 
[Статья]