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Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities

Опубликовано на портале: 09-12-2003
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000, 484 с.
Network utilities, such as electricity, telephones, and gas, are public utilities that require a fixed network to deliver their services. Because consumers have no choice of network, they risk exploitation by network owners. Once invested, however, a network's capital is sunk, and the bargaining advantage shifts from investor to consumer. The investor, fearing expropriation, may be reluctant to invest. The tension between consumer and investor can be side-stepped by state ownership. Alternatively, private ownership and consumers' political power can be reconciled through regulation. Either way, network utilities operate under terms set by the state.

David Newbery argues that price-setting rules comprise only part of the policy agenda. Network utilities pose special problems of ownership and regulation. He discusses the history of ownership and regulation, privatization, and theories of regulation. Examining three network utilities in detail--telecoms, electricity, and gas--he contrasts the regulatory approaches of Britain and the United States. He also looks at liberalization in a variety of other countries.

History shows that the mature forms of regulatory institutions are remarkably similar under both public and private ownership. This raises obvious questions such as: Will the forces that caused convergence to regulated vertical integration in the past reassert themselves? Can the benefits of competition be protected against the pressure to reintegrate? Will different utilities differ in their form and structure? A full understanding of the forces shaping regulatory institutions is necessary to answer these important questions.



Preface
Abbreviation and Units


1   Introduction
1.1 Privatization in Britain
1.2 U.K. Privatization Program
1.3 Property Rights, Structure, and Efficiency
1.4 Ownership and the Boundaries of the State
Appendix: Enterprises Privatized, 1979 to 1994


2   The Problem of Regulatory Commitment
2.1 Modeling the Regulatory Compact as a Game
2.2 Playing the Game: Commitment, Credibility, and Repetition
2.3 Rate-of-Return Regulation
2.4 Price Regulation
2.5 Design of Regulatory Institutions
2.6 Role of Licenses in U.K. Utility Regulation
2.7 Privatization and Regulation in Transitional Economies
2.8 Conclusions
Appendix A: Modeling Regulation as a Dynamic Game
Appendix B: U.K. Legislative Framework for Telecoms and Electricity


3   Ownership of Network Utilities
3.1 Local Utilities and Municipal Ownership
3.2 Nationwide Network Utilities
3.3 Macroeconomic Performance of Public Enterprises
3.4 Efficiency of Public and Privately Owned Network Utilities
Appendix: Evaluating Distributional Impacts


4   Theories of Regulation
4.1 Normative and Positive Theories of Regulation
4.2 Interest Group Influence on the English Electricity Industry
4.3 Dynamics of Regulatory Reform in the Bell Telephone System
4.4 Assessment of the Dynamics of Regulatory Change
4.5 Competition versus Regulation


5   Introducing Competition into Network Utilities
5.1 State Ownership and Competition
5.2 Liberalizing Entry while Retaining State Ownership
5.3 Procompetitive Reforms of State-Owned Utilities
5.4 The Case for State Ownership of the Network
5.5 Assessment of Competition and State Ownership
5.6 Vertical Separation or Liberalized Access?


6   Reforming the Electricity Supply Industry
6.1 Vertical Separation in Electricity: The English Example
6.2 Creating Markets for Electricity
6.3 Restructuring the CEGB and the Creation of the Electricity Pool
6.4 Was the Restructuring of the CEGB Worth It?
6.5 Creating Electricity Markets in Other Countries
6.6 Electricity Markets: Lessons from the Case Studies
6.7 Conclusions
Appendix: Modeling the Electricity Pool


7   Liberalizing the Telecommunications Industry
7.1 Pricing and Regulatory Inefficiencies
7.2 Distinctive Features of the Telecoms Industry
7.3 Possibility of Competition
7.4 Lessons to Be Drawn
7.5 Conclusions
Appendix: Telecoms Costs and TELRIC


8   Deregulation and Restructuring in Gas
8.1 Similarities and Differences between Gas and Electricity
8.2 Experience of Liberalization in the United States
8.3 Restructuring British Gas
8.4 Gas Liberalization on the Continent
8.5 Conclusions


9   Conclusions
9.1 Restructuring Network Utilities
9.2 Entry
9.3 Institutional Innovations Needed for Liberalization
9.4 Dispute Resolution
9.5 Differences between the Network Utilities
9.6 End of Regulation?
Appendix: Excess Entry in Oligopolies



Notes
References
Index


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