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Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis

Опубликовано на портале: 24-09-2003
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001
Markets are one of the most salient institutions produced by humans, and economists have traditionally analyzed the workings of the market mechanism. Recently, however, economists and others have begun to appreciate the many institution-related events and phenomena that have a significant impact on economic performance. Examples include the demise of the communist states, the emergence of Silicon Valley and e-commerce, the European currency unification, and the East Asian financial crises.
In this book Masahiko Aoki uses modern game theory to develop a conceptual and analytical framework for understanding issues related to economic institutions. The wide-ranging discussion considers how institutions evolve, why their overall arrangements are robust and diverse across economies, and why they do or do not change in response to environmental factors such as technological progress, global market integration, and demographic change.



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Acknowledgments

1.What Are Institutions? How Should We Approach Them?
1.1. Three Views of Institutions in a Game-Theoretic Perspective
1.2. Aspects of Institutions: Shared Beliefs, Summary Representations of Equilibrium, and Endogenous Rules of the Game
1.3. Organization of the Book

I. Proto-Institutions: Introducing Basic Types

2. Customary Property Rights and Community Norms
2.1. Customary Property Rights as a Self-organizing System
2.2. Community Norms as a Self-enforcing Solution to the Commons Problem
Appendix: History versus Ecology as a Determinant of a Norm: The Case of Yi Korea

3. The Private-Ordered Governance of Trade, Contracts, and Markets
3.1. Traders' Norms
3.2. Cultural Beliefs and Self-enforcing Employment Contracts
3.3. Private Third-Party Governance: The Law Merchant
3.4. Moral Codes
3.5. Overall Market Governance Arrangements
Appendix: Money as an Evolutive Convention

4. Organizational Architecture and Governance
4.1. Organizational Building Blocks: Hierarchical Decomposition, Information Assimilation, and Encapsulation
4.2. Types of Organizational Architecture
4.3. Governance of Organizational Architecture: A Preliminary Discussion

5. The Co-evolution of Organizational Conventions and Human Asset Types
5.1. Types of Mental Programs: Individuated versus Context-Oriented Human Assets
5.2. The Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizational Conventions
5.3. The Interactions of Organizational Fields and Gains from Diversity
5.4. The Relevance and Limits of the Evolutionary Game Model

6. States and Stable Equilibria in the Polity Domain
6.1. Three Prototypes of the State
6.2. Various Forms of the Democratic and Collusive States

II. A Game-Theoretic Framework for Institutional Analysis

7. A Game-Theoretic Concept of Institutions
7.1. Exogenous Rules of the Game and Endogenous Action-Choice Rules
7.2. The Institution as a Summary Representation of an Equilibrium Path
7.3. Feedback Loops of Institutionalization

8. The Synchronic Structure of Institutional Linkage
8.1. Social Embeddedness
8.2. Linked Games and Institutionalized Linkages
8.3. Institutional Complementarity

9. Subjective Game Models and the Mechanism of Institutional Change
9.1. Why Are Overall Institutional Arrangements Enduring?
9.2. Subjective Game Models and General Cognitive Equilibrium
9.3. The Mechanism of Institutional Change: The Cognitive Aspect

10. Diachronic Linkages of Institutions
10.1. Overlapping Social Embeddedness
10.2. The Reconfiguration of Bundling
10.3. Diachronic Institutional Complementarity

III. An Analysis of Institutional Diversity



11. Comparative Corporate Governance
11.1. Governance of the Functional Hierarchy
11.2. Codetermination in the Participatory Hierarchy
11.3. Relational-Contingent Governance of the Horizontal Hierarchy

12. Types of Relational Financing and the Value of Tacit Knowledge
12.1. A Generic Definition of Relational Financing and Its Knowledge-Based Taxonomy
12.2. The Institutional Viability of Relational Financing

13. Institutional Complementarities, Co-emergence, and Crisis: The Case of the Japanese Main Bank System
13.1. The Main Bank Institution as a System of Shared Beliefs
13.2. Institutional Emergence: Unintended Fits
13.3. Endogenous Inertia, Misfits with Changing Environments, and a Crisis of Shared Beliefs

14. Institutional Innovation of the Silicon Valley Model in the Product System Development
14.1. Information-Systemic Architecture of the Silicon Valley Model
14.2. The VC Governance of Innovation by Tournament
14.3. Norms and Values in the Silicon Valley Model
Appendix: The Stylized Factual Background for Modeling

15. Epilogue: Why Does Institutional Diversity Continue to Evolve?
15.1. Some Stylized Models of Overall Institutional Arrangements
15.2. Self-organizing Diversity in the Global Institutional Arrangement

Notes
References
Index
Ключевые слова

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