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Incentives and Political Economy (Clarendon Lectures in Economics).

Опубликовано на портале: 31-08-2003
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002
Laffont here constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using recent developments in contract theory. He treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of economic policy to self-interested politicians. Treating politicians successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers, he characterizes the optimal constitutional responses to the activities of interest groups in various circumstances, as well as the optimal trade-off between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas.


Laffont here constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using recent developments in contract theory. He treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of economic policy to self-interested politicians. Treating politicians successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers, he characterizes the optimal constitutional responses to the activities of interest groups in various circumstances, as well as the optimal trade-off between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas.
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Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
Part I: Politicians as Informed Supervisors
Chapter 2: The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design
Chapter 3: An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers
Chapter 4: Checks and Balances
Part II: Flexibility versus Discretion in Constitutional Design
Chapter 5: Political Economy and Industrial Policy
Chapter 6: Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy
Chapter 7: Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation
Part III: Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design
Chapter 8: Optimal Constitutional Responses to Coalition Formation
Chapter 9: Collusion and Decentralization
Chapter 10: Concluding Remarks