Property, Power, and Public Choice: An Inquiry into Law and Economics
Опубликовано на портале: 22-09-2003
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987, 322 с.
Little can happen in economic life that does not have distributional impact. Whose interests then count in the economy and in politics? This book addresses that question and explores the determining factors and forces. The author is interested in here in what governs institutional and systemic performance and how we may, objectively and nonpresumptively, analyze and understand the variables governing performance. The underlying motivation is twofold: first, to enable readers to better know what is going on in the economy and the polity; and second, to enable us to better choose and effectuate meaningful and consequential institutional changes. The focus is on human interdependence and how alternative property rights affect its outcome.
List of Figures and Tables
Part I. A Theory for the Study of Institutional Performance
1. A General Paradigm of Institutions and Performance
2. Property in a Social Context
Part II. Concepts for Property-Rights Analysis: Varieties and Degree of Interdependence
3. Incompatible Use and Exclusion Costs
4. Economies of Scale
5. Joint-Impact Goods
6. Transaction Costs
7. Surpluses, Demand and Supply Fluctuations, and Conclusions
Part III. Further Applications and Development of Paradigm
8. Economic and Political Applications
9. Restatement of Paradigm
10. Psychology: Linkage of Structure and Performance
Part IV. Possibilities of a Normative Analysis
11. Rules for Choice Among Alternative Institutions
Part V. Testing the Paradigm
12. Empirical Institutional Studies
About the Author
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