Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 1008 с.
Many instructors of microeconomic theory have been waiting for a text that provides balanced and in-depth analysis of the essentials of microeconomics. Masterfully combining the results of years of teaching microeconomics at Harvard University, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green have filled that conspicuous vacancy with their groundbreaking text, Microeconomic Theory.
The authors set out to create a solid organizational foundation upon which to build the effective teaching tool for microeconomic theory. The result presents unprecedented depth of coverage in all the essential topics, while allowing professors to "tailor-make" their course to suit personal priorities and style. Topics such as noncooperative game theory, information economics, mechanism design, and general equilibrium under uncertainty receive the attention that reflects their stature within the discipline. The authors devote an entire section to game theory alone, making it "free-standing" to allow instructors to return to it throughout the course when convenient. Discussion is clear, accessible, and engaging, enabling the student to gradually acquire confidence as well as proficiency. Extensive exercises within each chapter help students to hone their skills, while the text's appendix of terms, fully cross-referenced throughout the previous five sections, offers an accessible guide to the subject matter's terminology. Teachers of microeconomics need no longer rely upon scattered lecture notes to supplement their textbooks. Deftly written by three of the field's most influential scholars, Microeconomic Theory brings the readability, comprehensiveness, and versatility to the first-year graduate classroom that has long been missing.
- Part I: INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING
- Preference and Choice
- Consumer Choice
- Classical Demand Theory
- Aggregate Demand
- Choice under Uncertainty
- Part II: GAME THEORY
- Basic Elements of Non-Cooperative Games
- Simultaneous-Move Games
- Dynamic Games
- Part III: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE
- Competitive Markets
- Externalities and Public Goods
- Market Power
- Adverse Selection, Signalling, and Screening
- The Principal-Agent Problem
- Part IV: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
- General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples
- Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare Properties
- The Positive Theory of Equilibrium
- Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria
- General Equilibrium under Uncertainty
- Equilibrium and Time
- Part V: WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES
- Social Choice Theory
- Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining
- Incentives and Mechanism Design
- Mathematical Appendix
auction theory bargaining bayesian implementation expected utility externality general equilibrium incentive mechanism design moral hazard Nash equilibrium partial equilibrium public goods theory of social choice utility theory игры с торгом макроэкономическая теория математическое моделирование равновесие по Нэшу теория аукционов
Strategy Unit Harvard University Working Paper. 2001. No. 02-05.
On the Relation between the Expected Value and the Volatility of the Nominal Excess Return on Stocks
Journal of Finance. 1993. Vol. 48. No. 5. P. 1779-1801.
Персональная страница Алвина Рота (Alvin E. Roth, Professor of Economics and Business Administration in the Department of Economics at Harvard University): Al Roth's game theory and experimental economics page