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Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications. Vol. I

Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1992, cерия "Handbooks in Economics", 1, 733 с.
Тематический раздел:
This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science, and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines. The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers, an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethics.

См. также: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Vol. II

    Preface to Volume 1
    ROBERT J. AUMANN and SERGIU HART
  1. The Game of Chess
    HERBERT A. SIMON and JONATHAN SCHAEFFER
  2. Games in Extensive and Strategic Forms
    SERGIU HART
  3. Games with Perfect Information
    JAN MYCIELSKI
  4. Repeated Games with Complete Information
    SYLVAIN SORIN
  5. Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: Zero-Sum
    SHMUEL ZAMIR
  6. Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: Non-Zero-Sum
    FRANÇOISE FORGES
  7. Noncooperative Models of Bargaining
    KEN BINMORE, MARTIN J. OSBORNE and ARIEL RUBINSTEIN
  8. Strategic Analysis of Auctions
    ROBERT WILSON
  9. Location
    JEAN J. GABSZEWICZ and JACQUES-FRANÇOIS THISSE
  10. Strategic Models of Entry Deterrence
    ROBERT WILSON
  11. Patent Licensing
    MORTON I. KAMIEN
  12. The Core and Balancedness
    YAKAR KANNAI
  13. Axiomatizations of the Core
    BEZALEL PELEG
  14. The Core in Perfectly Competitive Economies
    ROBERT M. ANDERSON
  15. The Core in Imperfectly Competitive Economies
    JEAN J. GABSZEWICZ and BENYAMIN SHITOVITZ
  16. Two-Sided Matching
    ALVIN E. ROTH and MARILDA SOTOMAYOR
  17. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets
    WILLIAM F. LUCAS
  18. The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus
    MICHAEL MASCHLER
  19. Game and Decision Theoretic Models in Ethics
    JOHN C. HARSANYI

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