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Games and Information

Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2007
Факультет: Economics
Дисциплина: Game Theory
Год: Fall, 2006
Язык: Английский
Тематический раздел: Теория игр

This is an advanced Ph.D. course in game theory, intended both for students who are interested in producing research in microeconomic theory, and for those who would like to acquire a solid background in game theory to support their research in other areas such as applied work. The course will cover a combination of standard “textbook” results and some topics of current research. The first third of the course will review some basic ideas from Econ 200c and then extend the study of solution concepts in complete information and Bayesian games. The second third will focus attention on auctions, mechanism design, and repeated games. The last third of the course will study behavioral game theory.

Tentative Schedule of Topics:
  1. Rationalizability, Nash and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection: review and advanced treatment
  2. Information partitions and knowledge
  3. Games of extensive form with incomplete information: perfect Bayesian equilibrium; sequential equilibrium; trembling hand perfection in extensive form; proper equilibria
  4. Extensive form concepts continued
  5. Evolutionary approaches to equilibrium
  6. Spillover or some applications to bargaining, signaling, etc.
  7. Repeated games: The folk theorem, dynamic programming
  8. Repeated games with hidden action & private information
  9. Reputation
  10. Mechanism design: Revelation principle, envelope theorem, ex post vs. Bayesian incentive compatibility
  11. Mechanism design: Budget balance and individual rationality
  12. Auctions: efficiency
  13. Auctions: revenue and other concerns
  14. Behavioral game theory

Vince Crawford’s segment with lecture notes:

Navin Kartik’s segment with lecture notes:

Ключевые слова

См. также:
Geoffrey A. Jehle, Philip John Reny
Rami Zwick, Amnon Rapoport, Alison King Chung Lo, A.V. Muthukrishnan
Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole
Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Econometrica. 1987.  Vol. 55. No. 3. P. 615-632. 
Levent Kockesen
[Учебная программа]
Lawrence M. Ausubel
[Учебная программа]
Patrick L. Bajari
[Учебная программа]