Games and Information

Aннотация:
This is an advanced Ph.D. course in game theory, intended both for students who are interested in producing research in microeconomic theory, and for those who would like to acquire a solid background in game theory to support their research in other areas such as applied work. The course will cover a combination of standard “textbook” results and some topics of current research. The first third of the course will review some basic ideas from Econ 200c and then extend the study of solution concepts in complete information and Bayesian games. The second third will focus attention on auctions, mechanism design, and repeated games. The last third of the course will study behavioral game theory.

Tentative Schedule of Topics:

1. Rationalizability, Nash and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection: review and advanced treatment
2. Information partitions and knowledge
3. Games of extensive form with incomplete information: perfect Bayesian equilibrium; sequential equilibrium; trembling hand perfection in extensive form; proper equilibria
4. Extensive form concepts continued
5. Evolutionary approaches to equilibrium
6. Spillover or some applications to bargaining, signaling, etc.
7. Repeated games: The folk theorem, dynamic programming
8. Repeated games with hidden action & private information
9. Reputation
10. Mechanism design: Revelation principle, envelope theorem, ex post vs. Bayesian incentive compatibility
11. Mechanism design: Budget balance and individual rationality
12. Auctions: efficiency
13. Auctions: revenue and other concerns
14. Behavioral game theory