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Seminar in Finance: Aggregate Implications of Financial Contracting

Опубликовано на портале: 21-10-2003
Факультет: Kelogg School of Management
Кафедра: Finance Department
Год: Spring 2002
Язык: Английский
Тематические разделы: Экономика, Финансовая экономика

This course is a second year graduate topics course in financial economics. The course studies the equilibrium implications of endogenous financial contracts. Static and dynamic models of economies with contracting frictions (e.g., imperfect information and limited enforceability) and optimally determined financial contracts are covered and the implications for both quantities and prices are considered. The course is thus at the intersection of corporate finance/contract theory and asset pricing/macroeconomics. Specific topics covered include the dynamics of agency costs, financial intermediation, liquidity, collateral, default and non-exclusive contracts.

1. Dynamics of Agency Costs and Aggregate Activity
2. Collateral and Asset Prices
3. Reallocation and Q
4. Financial Intermediation
5. Credit and Aggregate Liquidity
6. Non-exclusive Contracts and Microfoundations of Incomplete Markets

1. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), Recursive Macroeconomic Theory, MIT Press.
2. Scheinkman, J. and L. Weiss (1986). Borrowing Constraints and Aggregate Economic Activity. Econometrica 54, 23-45
3. Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore (1997). Credit Cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105, 211-48.
4. Cabalero, R. and M. Hammour (1998). The Macroeconomics of Specifcity. Journal of Political Economy 106, 724-67.
5. Holmstrfom, B., and J. Tirole (1997). Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663-91.
6. Holmstrfom, B., and J. Tirole (1998). Private and Public Supply of Liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 106, 1-40.
7. Townsend, R. (1982). Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relation-ships under Private Information. Journal of Political Economy 90, 1166-86.
8. Allen, F. (1985). Repeated Principal-agent Relationships with Lending and Borrowing. Economic Letters 17, 27-31.

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