Proceeding from the question, «What compels a moral (sittliches) life and by means of what structures?» the author subjects to the critical consideration A. Honneth’s statement about normative monism of recognition in the sphere of morals. The article analyzes how (on what methodical bases) the universalization of the relation of recognition, that presupposes bringing various forms of social interrelation (namely: love, legal recogni-
tion and solidarity) to the uniform sample, the uniform logic of bilateral recognition, is reached. In this connection it is shown, that such bringing is possible at the cost of ignoring of own ethical
potential of such forms of intersubjective experience as the relation between the sexes and the adult-child relation. In respect of the ideas history there comes to light the irrelevance of Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel to the key thesis of the philosophy of spirit (resp. the philosophy of Sittlichkeit) of the German classic. The
author speci"es the possibility of alternative actualizing Hegel’s reading, which could overcome reductionism and conceptual dead-ends of the position of the methodical individualism represented by Honneth.