на главную поиск contacts

Economies with Asymmetrically Informed Agents: Concept of Limit Information

русская версия

Опубликовано на портале: 30-03-2010
In this paper, a new concept of “limit information” is introduced and studied for Arrow–Debreu type economies with asymmetrically informed agents. The concept is based on the so called contractual approach, that presumes agents are met and form coalitions where commodity and informational exchange is realized. So, in the course of a natural exchange process, the agents’ information is transformed and garnered, and the agents are taught and achieve the limit information. The exchange of information is endogenously defined in the model via an information rule. It is proved that for a monotonic information sharing rule, the limit information is uniquely defined, i.e., it does not depend of the chain of coalitions implemented in the process of interaction between economic agents.
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Елена Владиславовна Савицкая, Наталья Сергеевна Алтунина
Journal of Institutional Studies (Журнал институциональных исследований). 2017.  Т. 9. № 1. С. 117-133. 
Виталий Леонидович Тамбовцев
Мария Марковна Юдкевич, Елена Анатольевна Подколзина, Анна Юрьевна Рябинина