Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts

Agency conflicts and ownership concentration

русская версия

Опубликовано на портале: 31-12-2010
Корпоративные финансы. 2010.  № 2 (14). С. 84-93. 
Тематический раздел:
The aim of this review is to classify research papers on “major vs. minor shareholders” conflicts and ownership concentration. These issues are closely related both to each other and to “manager vs. owner” conflicts. Ownership concentration is property distribution among shareholders. Ownership concentration studies consider the following questions: how many major and minor shareholders are there in the company; how many inside shareholders are there and if they are minor or major; in what way concentration influences performance of the company; what costs are associated with “major vs. minor shareholders” conflicts etc. The bond between ownership concentration and “manager vs. owner” conflict is due to the fact that often managers are major shareholders along with other owners. In such cases incentive hypothesis, entranchement hypothesis, monitoring and control costs, as well as their effect on performance, should be considered together.
BiBTeX
RIS
Ключевые слова

См. также:
А.В. Новоселов
Экономические науки. 2010.  Т. 72. № 11. С. 176-179. 
[Статья]
Никита Константинович Пирогов, Н А Бобрышев
Корпоративные финансы. 2009.  № 2 (10). С. 40-56. 
[Статья]
Дмитрий Александрович Козлов, Елена Владимировна Чиркова
Корпоративные финансы. 2009.  № 2 (10). С. 88-111. 
[Статья]
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper. 2004.  No. 491.
[Статья]
Ростислав Исаакович Капелюшников, Наталья Владимировна Демина
Препринты Высшей школы экономики. 2005.  № 04.
[Статья]