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Amplification the incentive effects in the construction work contracts as risky institutional transplantation

русская версия

Опубликовано на портале: 23-01-2013
High-powered incentives are still often considered in Russia as an undoubtedly efficient tool to overcome moral hazard problem. This point of view remains popular despite the failure of incentive contracts in the motivation system of the US CEO and the recent theoretical advancements which help to explain the reasons for this failure by so called negative contract externalities. The causes and consequences of high-powered motivation system which became widespread in the USA at the end of the twentieth century are described in the paper. It cautions against its thoughtless institutional transplantation totally inspired by the desire to create incentives which are strong enough to prevent the opportunistic behavior and calls attention to the danger to create incentives which are excessively strong.
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