@ARTICLE{16775244_2000, author = {Fehr, Ernst and Gachter, Simon}, keywords = {}, title = {Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2000}, month = {}, volume = {90}, number = {4}, pages = {980-994}, url = {http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/16775244/}, publisher = {}, language = {ru}, abstract = {This paper shows experimentally that there is a widespread willingness of cooperators to punish free-riders. Results indicate that this holds true even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. In addition, evidence is provided that free-riders are punished the more heavily the more they deviate from the cooperation levels of the cooperators. }, annote = {This paper shows experimentally that there is a widespread willingness of cooperators to punish free-riders. Results indicate that this holds true even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. In addition, evidence is provided that free-riders are punished the more heavily the more they deviate from the cooperation levels of the cooperators. } }